No one has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with an informant who was parked in a driveway talking to the defendant and recording him. United States v. Scott, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62401 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2011)*:<\/p>\n
The recording of the conversation between the Defendant and Reynolds in the driveway of the Defendant\u2019s Heritage Drive residence on August 19, 2009, was not obtained pursuant to a warrant or the Defendant’s consent. The Defendant and the Government have stipulated that the Defendant would testify that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his conversation with Reynolds in the driveway of his Heritage Drive residence on August 19, 2009, that Reynolds was not told of the recording device in the informant\u2019s vehicle, and that the Defendant would testify that he did not know of the recording device in the informant\u2019s vehicle. Consequently, the key question is whether the Defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his oral communication with Reynolds on August 19, 2009. The Court finds that he did not.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The officer here allegedly stopped and engaged the defendant in conversation and got confusing answers. She asked for his ID, and then asked for a warrant check. A warrant came up, but she was going to let him go until he became belligerent. Then she arrested him. The warrant\u2019s existence was an intervening circumstance. State v. Hummons<\/a>, 227 Ariz. 78, 253 P.3d 275 (2011).*<\/p>\n
Officer responding to an attempted suicide call did not act unreasonably nor violate the Fourth Amendment and thus had qualified immunity in entering a door and staying there to ascertain the mental state of the person, particularly after she blew up on him. Roberts v. Spielman<\/a>, 643 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2011).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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