{"id":5658,"date":"2011-06-26T09:30:48","date_gmt":"2011-06-17T10:29:11","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2011-06-17T10:29:11","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=5658","title":{"rendered":"SCOTUS approves Gant<\/em> good faith exception, and gutting exclusionary rule?"},"content":{"rendered":"

SCOTUS approves Gant good faith exception where officers followed Belton, and were not culpable in any way. Davis v. United States<\/a>, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4560 (June 16, 2011) (7-2). The syllabus:<\/p>\n

While conducting a routine vehicle stop, police arrested petitioner Willie Davis, a passenger, for giving a false name. After handcuffing Davis and securing the scene, the police searched the vehicle and found Davis\u2019s revolver. Davis was then indicted on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a suppression motion, Davis acknowledged that the search of the vehicle complied with existing Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, but Davis raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to preserve the issue on appeal. The District Court denied the motion, and Davis was convicted. While his appeal was pending, this Court announced, in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, ___, a new rule governing automobile searches incident to arrests of recent occupants. The Eleventh Circuit held, under Gant, that the vehicle search at issue violated Davis\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights, but the court declined to suppress the revolver and affirmed Davis\u2019s conviction.<\/p>\n

Held: Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule. Pp. 6-20.<\/p>\n

(a) The exclusionary rule\u2019s sole purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141, and its operation is limited to situations in which this purpose is \u201cthought most efficaciously served,\u201d United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348. For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh the rule\u2019s heavy costs. Under a line of cases beginning with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, the result of this cost-benefit analysis turns on the \u201cflagrancy of the police misconduct\u201d at issue. Id., at 909, 911. When the police exhibit \u201cdeliberate,\u201d \u201creckless,\u201d or \u201cgrossly negligent\u201d disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the benefits of exclusion tend to outweigh the costs. Herring, supra, at 144. But when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrent value of suppression is diminished, and exclusion cannot \u201cpay its way.\u201d See Leon, supra, at 909, 919, 908, n. 6; Herring, supra, at 137. Pp. 6-9.<\/p>\n

(b) Although the search in this case turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant, Davis concedes that the officers\u2019 conduct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way. Under this Court\u2019s exclusionary-rule precedents, the acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis\u2019s claim. Pp. 9-11.<\/p>\n

(c) The Court is not persuaded by arguments that other considerations should prevent the good-faith exception from applying in this case. Pp. 11-19.<\/p>\n

(1) The argument that the availability of the exclusionary rule to enforce new Fourth Amendment precedent is a retroactivity issue, not a good-faith issue, is unpersuasive. This argument erroneously conflates retroactivity with remedy. Because Davis\u2019s conviction had not become final when Gant was announced, Gant applies retroactively in this case, and Davis may invoke its newly announced rule as a basis for seeking relief. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326, 328. But retroactive application of a new rule does not determine the question of what remedy the defendant should obtain. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83, 84. The remedy of exclusion does not automatically follow from a Fourth Amendment violation, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13, and applies only where its \u201cpurpose is effectively advanced,\u201d Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347. The application of the good-faith exception here neither contravenes Griffith nor denies retroactive effect to Gant. Pp. 12-16.<\/p>\n

(2) Nor is the Court persuaded by the argument that applying the good-faith exception to searches conducted in reliance on binding precedent will stunt the development of Fourth Amendment law by discouraging criminal defendants from attacking precedent. Facilitating the overruling of precedent has never been a relevant consideration in this Court\u2019s exclusionary-rule cases. In any event, applying the good-faith exception in this context will not prevent this Court\u2019s review of Fourth Amendment precedents. If precedent from a federal court of appeals or state court of last resort upholds a particular type of search or seizure, defendants in jurisdictions where the question remains open will still have an undiminished incentive to litigate the issue, and this Court can grant certiorari in one of those cases. Davis\u2019s claim that this Court\u2019s Fourth Amendment precedents will be effectively insulated from challenge is overstated. In many cases, defendants will test this Court\u2019s Fourth Amendment precedents by arguing that they are distinguishable. And at most, this argument might suggest that, in a future case, the Court could allow a petitioner who secures a decision overruling one of this Court\u2019s precedents to obtain suppression of evidence in that one case. Pp. 16-19.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

See Law.com: In sharp tones, Court curbs the exclusionary rule<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court on Thursday took direct aim at the exclusionary rule, with a 7-2 majority saying that evidence collected during a police search can be used against a defendant, even if the search is of a type that is later found unconstitutional. <\/p>\n

New justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor joined in the majority’s hostile approach toward the exclusionary rule, leading a dissenter to wonder if the rule \u2014 already weakened by recent decisions \u2014 might be on life support. <\/p>\n

“If the Court means what it says, what will happen to the exclusionary rule?” asked Justice Stephen Breyer in a dissent joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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