The fact the officer had reasonable suspicion for five days did not mean that he could not stop the defendant. United States v. Gatewood, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41477 (W.D. Tenn. April 15, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41433 (W.D. Tenn. March 8, 2011):<\/p>\n
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the \u201cmere passage of time … does not negate the lawfulness of a stop\u201d that is otherwise justified under the circumstances. United States v. Marxen<\/a>, 410 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 2005). \u201cRather, the time between the commission of the crime and the subsequent stop is simply one factor … to consider in determining whether officers had specific and articulable facts which constituted a reasonable suspicion.\u201d Id. \u201cHensley<\/a> is not undermined where … police are not able to locate the suspect … immediately after the [felony] and during a time within which contraband and other fruits of the crime are more likely to be found.\u201d Id. at 330 n.4 (explaining that \u201cthe difference in a traffic stop occurring eleven days\u2014as opposed to one or two days\u2014following the criminal activity is not dispositive\u201d).<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
… Under the totality of the circumstances, that five days elapsed before Officer Tuznik stopped Gatewood, does not destroy that reasonable suspicion. See Marxen<\/a>, 410 F.3d at 330. …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant had possession of a vehicle owned by another, but that does not grant him standing, which he did not show. United States v. Varela, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41684 (D. Ariz. February 17, 2011).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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