Defendant parolee was a passenger in a car and he had his car key fob on him. The car, albeit not there, was still \u201cunder his control\u201d for a parole search, relying on United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2017) (hotel room two miles away was under parolee\u2019s control because he had a key). United States v. Dorsey, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30523 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
No clearly established law means qualified immunity. State AG\u2019s memorandum just isn\u2019t it. \u201cIn this respect, Pierner-Lytge comes up well short. She has not \u2018identified a single precedent\u2014much less a controlling case or robust consensus of cases\u2014finding violation under similar circumstances. [Westby] at 591 \u2026. Instead, Pierner-Lytge relies on a 2009 Advisory Memorandum from the Wisconsin Attorney General \u2026.\u201d Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 4362 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2023).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Failure to signal and unrestrained children in the car justified the stop. United States v. Davis, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29888 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2023).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Defendant parolee was a passenger in a car and he had his car key fob on him. The car, albeit not there, was still \u201cunder his control\u201d for a parole search, relying on United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175 … Continue reading