{"id":5382,"date":"2011-07-10T08:20:31","date_gmt":"2011-04-02T08:20:49","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2011-04-02T08:20:49","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=5382","title":{"rendered":"CA8: Bringing theft victim to search scene to ID stuff did not violate the Fourth Amendment"},"content":{"rendered":"

On discovering a large cache of stuff in defendant\u2019s house on execution of a search warrant for stolen property, it was not unreasonable for the police to bring an alleged victim there to identify what was his. And, even if it was unreasonable, it would not really lead to suppression of the evidence. United States v. Gregoire<\/a>, 638 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2011):<\/p>\n

In Wilson v. Layne<\/a>, 526 U.S. 603, 611-12, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999), the Supreme Court noted: \u201cWhere the police enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property, the presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has long been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition.\u201d That is precisely what happened in this case. Citing no supporting authority, Gregoire argues the principle should not apply because the Arnolds\u2019 presence was not needed to identify the specific items named in the warrant. But this is not a constitutional prerequisite. When the police entered Gregoire\u2019s home to execute the warrant, they discovered a massive cache of items that appeared to fall within the universe of the suspected thefts. It was objectively reasonable for the officers to turn to the Arnolds, owners and managers of Reed\u2019s, a theft victim, for help in confirming which items there was probable cause to believe had been stolen. \u201cThe general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis … governs the method of execution of the warrant.\u201d United States v. Ramirez<\/a>, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S. Ct. 992, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1998). The execution of the warrant to search Gregoire’s home was constitutionally reasonable. 1<\/p>\n

1 We further agree with Magistrate Judge Raymond Erickson that, even if the presence of the Arnolds violated the Fourth Amendment as construed in Wilson v. Layne<\/a>, this would not require suppression of the evidence seized. See United States v. Hendrixson<\/a>, 234 F.3d 494, 496-97 (11th Cir. 2000).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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