It is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a DEA agent to stop a car on state highways for an alleged traffic violation. There was probable cause for an automobile exception search. United States v. Vallejos, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221815 (D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2021).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cDefendant-appellant Arthur Miles argues that the stop flouted the Fourth Amendment because the officer’s stated reason for making the stop was pretextual and his real reason was based on nothing more than a hunch. The appellant’s argument runs headlong into Supreme Court precedent holding that the Fourth Amendment calculus depends on objective reasonableness, not subjective intent. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).\u201d It was objectively reasonable. United States v. Miles<\/a>, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 34122 (1st Cir. Nov. 17, 2021).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n Defendant\u2019s claim defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search that revealed drugs on a codefendant is denied for lack of standing. Williams v. United States, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222165 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a DEA agent to stop a car on state highways for an alleged traffic violation. There was probable cause for an automobile exception search. United States v. Vallejos, 2021 U.S. Dist. … Continue reading