\u201cAgent Ramirez\u2019s decision to stop Defendant’s vehicle was based on factors too common to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (reasonable suspicion cannot rely solely on generalizations that, if accepted, cast suspicion on large segments or entire categories of the law abiding population).\u201d Apparently, being a law abiding citizen is believed to be reasonable suspicion in Arizona. United States v. Mikels, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133895 (D. Ariz. November 3, 2010).*<\/p>\n
There was reasonable suspicion for defendants\u2019 stop as drug traffickers, and a drug dog was called and alerted, and that made probable cause for a search of the vehicle. The court suggests that it was defendants\u2019 burden to show that the search was invalid. \u201cAlthough Defendant Cooper offers no substantive argument in support of his claim that the search of the Lincoln was unlawful \u2013 beyond the claim that the stop and detention were unlawful, he asserts that there was neither probable cause nor consent for the search. … Defendant is wrong.\u201d United States v. Parker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133789 (N.D. Ga. November 18, 2010).*<\/p>\n
A male Lt. Col. in the Army was married to a female Capt. He was the subject of a child molestation investigation from being stationed in PR. In Georgia, Army investigators called in the Capt. for questioning, and she consented to a search of their home office, which should could do because she had joint access. After Army CID officers got in, they got a search warrant for child pornography in the computers and videos, which they validly found. The computers arguably were within his exclusive control, but access to them was by search warrant. United States v. Pagan-Torres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133832 (N.D. Ga. November 15, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading