{"id":4947,"date":"2011-05-01T18:32:54","date_gmt":"2010-11-27T16:50:27","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2010-11-27T16:50:27","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=4947","title":{"rendered":"CA10: A person can live in two places at once for Payton\/Steagald<\/em> purposes"},"content":{"rendered":"

It is possible for somebody to have two residences, and then the court must decide whether Payton<\/a> or Steagald<\/a> applies if a third party is involved. Here, the officers had a reasonable belief defendant would be found in the place they entered under Steagald<\/a>. United States v. Thompson<\/a>, 402 Fed. Appx. 378 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):<\/p>\n

The Payton<\/a>\/Steagald<\/a> distinction does not lend itself to resolving the situation where a suspect lives in more than one dwelling. Here, for example, the officers had information suggesting that, on the one hand, Thompson lived at 2213 N. Kelham and, on the other, that he lived at 4619 Creek Court. Can officers reasonably believe that a suspect lives at two or more places? The language in Payton<\/a> suggests the answer is yes. Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the Court, stated that, \u201can arrest warrant founded on probable cause carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.\u201d Payton v. New York<\/a>, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980) (emphasis added). The use of the indefinite article \u201ca\u201d before \u201cdwelling\u201d suggests the \u201cdwelling\u201d need not be a specific dwelling. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner\u2019s Modern American Usage (3rd ed. 2009) (\u201cEach of these [indefinite articles] points to a non-specific object, thing, or person that is not distinguished from the other members of a class.\u201d) The members of this class \u2014 as suggested by the language in Payton<\/a> \u2014 would be the various dwellings in which the suspect lives. Had the Court contemplated a particular dwelling, that is, had the Court limited the reach of its rule to one dwelling per suspect, then it would have used the definite article \u201cthe,\u201d which refers to a particular thing, in this case, a particular dwelling. See id. Given the Court\u2019s choice of the indefinite article in writing \u201ca dwelling,\u201d the Court must have contemplated that a suspect can live in more than one dwelling. See also, e.g., United States v. Risse<\/a>, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996) (\u201cWe have found no authority to support [the defendant\u2019s] implicit assumption that a person can have only one residence for Fourth Amendment purposes.\u201d).<\/p>\n

We conclude, then, that Payton does not void as \u201cunreasonable\u201d an officer\u2019s belief that a suspect lives in a given dwelling merely because that suspect also \u201clives\u201d in another. Here, although police may have reasonably believed Thompson lived at 2213 N. Kelham, it was also reasonable for them to believe he lived at 4619 Creek Court. This point is underscored by this court\u2019s gloss on Payton. In Valdez v. McPheters<\/a>, we stated that \u201c[t]he rule announced in Payton is applicable so long as the suspect \u2018possesses common authority over, or some other significant relationship to,\u2019 the residence entered by police.\u201d Valdez v. McPheters<\/a>, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Risse<\/a>, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996)). We acknowledge the term \u201csignificant relationship\u201d lacks ideal utility. At what point, for example, does a suspect\u2019s relationship with a residence become \u201csignificant\u201d such that he or she can be said to be living there? This question could flummox law enforcement. We trust, however, that law enforcement will take the plain meaning of the word \u201csignificant\u201d \u2014 important, notable \u2014 and not abuse this admittedly permissive standard. Whether they do so, unfortunately, we must address on a case-by-case basis. In any event, given the totality of the information the officers had in this case, we find that the officers reasonably believed Thompson had a \u201csignificant relationship\u201d with the 4619 Creek Court address. Accordingly, under this analysis the officers did not require a search warrant to enter that residence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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