A probate court order that authorized a pickup of the plaintiff on a mental commitment was governed by the Fourth Amendment, and the fact the plaintiff’s address was not shown in the court papers. Motion to suppress evidence found granted. United States v. Sullivan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73859 (M.D. Ala. August 18, 2006):<\/p>\n
The emergency order alone is insufficient to support a reasonable belief on the part of the deputies that the Yarbrough Circle address was, in fact, Yeager’s “dwelling,” rather than merely her “location,” as required by the first part of the Bervaldi test — if, indeed, the deputies even harbored this belief. See supra at n. 3. Nothing in the record indicates that the deputies conducted any investigation, other than reviewing the emergency order — for example, by checking a telephone directory or verifying the receipt of mail, seeking information from neighbors or relatives, or observing activity at the house — to confirm that the Yarbrough Circle home was in fact Yeager’s residence prior to their entry.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer had reasonable suspicion for detention of the defendant, who had been found passed out at the wheel of his car in a convenience store parking lot. Paramedics said he was “acting weird” and likely on drugs, but he was medically cleared. Defendant said he fell asleep drinking coffee and lived a few doors away, and that was inconsistent with the prior version. United States v. Bailey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73878 (D. Utah October 10, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Plaintiffs stated claims for discriminatory or unconstitutional stops based on the Fourth Amendment but they failed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim on summary judgment, except a plaintiff who showed that race was a possible factor coupled with reports from the police department that race should not be a factor in stops. Maryland State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, 454 F. Supp. 2d 339 (D. Md. September 29, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Federal action that was but an appeal from a state court decision on the same issue was barred by the Rooker-Feldman<\/em> Doctrine. Johnson v. City of Prospect Hts., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73649 (N.D. Ill. September 27, 2006)*:<\/p>\n
The Rooker-Feldman<\/em> doctrine mandates that district courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims which are essentially appeals from the state courts. Burke v. Johnston<\/em>, 452 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2006). “It applies to cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgements… inviting district court review and rejection of these judgements.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., <\/em>544 U.S. 280 (2005). The Seventh Circuit instructs that the “doctrine applies only where a litigant seeks to overturn a state-court judgment.” Kathrein v. McGrath, <\/em>2006 WL 287433 (7th Cir. 2006). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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