After the jury verdict, the court grants the motion to suppress on the ground the defendant\u2019s stop was without reasonable suspicion and the search was without cause, and a judgment of acquittal is entered. United States v. Foster, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2010):<\/p>\n
Importantly, the Fourth Amendment does not permit police to conduct routine, suspicionless searches of people or vehicles during traffic stops. See Long<\/a>, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.14 (\u201cWe stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop ….\u201d). Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently held in Arizona v. Gant<\/a>, even if a traffic stop leads to an arrest, the police may not automatically search the stopped vehicle. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723-24, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (\u201cPolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.\u201d). To the extent that the government argues otherwise in this case, the government is mistaken.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
North Minneapolis is indeed a high-crime area, but the vast majority of its residents, and the vast majority of those driving through it, are not criminals. The Court does not believe that when police see a person lean forward in a car that they have stopped \u2014 even if they have stopped the car late at night in a high-crime area \u2014 they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. There are simply too many alternative explanations for why a person would lean forward, such as to retrieve ID from a purse or backpack, or to move from a slouched to an upright position in the seat. … <\/p>\n
In sum, the Court cannot find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Bohnsack and Ochs had reasonable suspicion to believe that Foster was armed and dangerous when Foster stepped out of the car at the officers’ request. Accordingly, Bohnsack was not justified in conducting a patdown search of Foster. The Court therefore suppresses the magazine that was found in Foster’s pocket. Further, because Bohnsack and Ochs would not have had any reason to search the interior of the Taurus if Bohnsack had not found the magazine on Foster’s person, the Court suppresses the gun that was found in the Taurus. Without this evidence, no reasonable jury could find Foster guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm or ammunition, and the Court therefore grants Foster’s motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the jury’s verdict.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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