While there was no reasonable suspicion for the continued detention of the defendants, the court finds the driver\u2019s consent was valid and the product of independent free will sufficient to overcome it. United States v. Eskichyan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109836 (M.D. La. October 12, 2010)*:<\/p>\n
The Court does not doubt Officer Averette’s credibility, nor his training and experience. The Court also does not doubt that defendants’ criminal histories may have been in Officer Averette’s mind and that he was frightened when he called for backup. But no amount of training or experience can turn the simple, objective facts that defendants had criminal histories and exhibited ordinary nervousness into articulable suspicion that defendants were about to commit a crime. If such common circumstances qualified as reasonable suspicion, then many \u2014 if not most \u2014 interstate travelers would be subject to prolonged detention. Weighing the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain defendants after the computer check was complete, and therefore, the detention was unconstitutional.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
[Oh, come on. The continuation of the stop was clearly invalid, but the consent was valid anyway without a notice to the driver of his right to refuse?]<\/p>\n
The officer pulled in behind defendants\u2019 car in the driveway, but they did not see it until they were out of the car. This was not a stop because they were on foot when they talked to the officers. The blocking of the car was not a stop because they were not stopped. The passenger lacked standing to challenge a search of the car. Thus, the passenger cannot invoke Brendlin<\/a>. United States v. Allison<\/a>, 398 Fed. Appx. 862 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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