An escapee has no greater rights than he had in his prison cell or as a parolee. He essentially has no subjective reasonable expectation of privacy that anyone would recognize anywhere he is found. United States v. Cartwright, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106473 (N.D. Okla. October 5, 2010):<\/p>\n
The question now before the Court is where to place Cartwright on the continuum of punishment between a convict in his cell and a probationer. The Court finds that there should be no functional difference between Cartwright and the prisoner in Hudson, as a prisoner may not alter the terms of his imprisonment by means of escape. Although the question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction, other circuits have held that one who effects his own escape does not gain the benefit of additional constitutional protections. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Citing, inter alia, United States v. Roy<\/a>, 734 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Ward<\/a>, 561 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2009). To my knowledge, no case holds to the contrary.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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