The government\u2019s claim of defendant\u2019s abandonment came as a result of defendant\u2019s disavowal of ownership of a duffle bag full of cash after it was illegally seized. That is not abandonment, and the motion to suppress is granted. The exclusionary rule needs to apply to deter such actions. United States v. Templeton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87616 (D. Ariz. August 2, 2010):<\/p>\n
An “abandonment must be voluntary, and an abandonment that results from [a] Fourth Amendment violation cannot be voluntary.” United States v. Stephens<\/a>, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the officers conducted an illegal search of the vehicle and duffle bag and then asked whether the evidence found during that search belonged to Templeton. Templeton stated it did not, but that abandonment was involuntary as a matter of law. See United States v. Nicholson<\/a>, 144 F.3d 632, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding abandonment involuntary as a matter of law when the abandonment occurred after officers’ Fourth Amendment violations). It would undermine one of the core purposes of the exclusionary rule if the government could conduct illegal searches, confront individuals with the fruits of those searches, and then rely on the illegally obtained evidence if the individual stated the evidence did not belong to him. See Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1054 (purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct). Accepting the United States’ position would, in effect, provide an incentive for the government to conduct illegal searches in the hopes that a suspect will disclaim ownership of the evidence illegally discovered. 2The Court cannot encourage such actions. See Herring v. United States<\/a>, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (exclusionary rule should be applied when it will deter future Fourth Amendment violations).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant\u2019s right wheels briefly touching the fog line was not a violation of Nebraska law, so the stop was invalid. United States v. Magallanes, 730 F. Supp. 2d 969 (D. Neb. 2010).*<\/p>\n
On an arrest of co-conspirators two blocks away from defendant\u2019s house, officers returned to the house to conduct an immediate warrantless entry. They had probable cause for the search, and, although a search warrant had not been issued, \u201c[t]he facts in this case present a textbook example of the proper application of the independent source doctrine.\u201d United States v. Martinez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88282 (S.D. Fla. August 26, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Based on these same circumstances, and as per Murray, the independent source doctrine applies. We will assume that the agents’ entry into the apartment following the defendants’ arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, paraphrasing the Supreme Court, knowledge that the cocaine and paraphernalia were inside the apartment was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also later acquired at the time of entry pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry there is also no reason here why the independent source doctrine should not apply.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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