The motion to suppress the stop of defendant\u2019s tractor trailer is granted because the court does not believe the officer. United States v. Moore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86906 (E.D. Mich. August 24, 2010)*:<\/p>\n
It was not objectively reasonable for Corporal Bazzi to believe that the left turn signal on Moore\u2019s semi-tractor was not illuminated. While Officer King testified that it was \u201ca little foggy\u201d on the night of the traffic stop, Corporal Bazzi had sufficient opportunity to determine whether the turn signal was illuminated. He had Moore’s semi-tractor and trailer under surveillance for a couple of hours, and Officer King testified that Moore was driving slow. [\u00b6] The Court finds the stop of Moore’s semi-tractor and trailer was unlawful at its inception.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
On de novo review from the USMJ\u2019s grant of the motion to suppress for probable cause, the USDJ finds that there was, in fact, probable cause for search of the bag in defendant\u2019s possession. The USDJ looked at the bag. United States v. Marshall, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86983 (S.D. Fla. August 24, 2010),* rejecting in part R&R 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86986 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2010)* [another example of the government getting two bites at the apple; the hearing before the USMJ is binding on the defendant but just a dry run for the government?].<\/p>\n
\u201cBased on the information provided by [CI] Olmsted\u2014particularly that he had seen the anhydrous tank in the past week or so and had witnessed meth being cooked there before\u2014along with [Officer] Kingsley\u2019s own experience concerning methamphetamine labs, Kingsley had specific facts to form a reasonable suspicion that there was a meth lab in the cabin.\u201d United States v. Barttelt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86786 (W.D. Wis. August 23, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Weaving and driving too slow justified defendant\u2019s stop because he might have been impaired, rejecting the R&R. United States v. Skutley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86643 (D. Utah August 19, 2010).*<\/p>\n
In February 2009, defendant finally consented to an entry of his house so the police could look for another person. Inside, they saw a gun case and they knew defendant was a felon. They felt the gun case and told him to get rid of the gun. In December 2009, the police came back to serve an eviction notice on the defendant, and the gun was seen again. The second entry was valid. United States v. Preston, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87098 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Corroboration of a 911 call was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sanders<\/a>, 394 Fed. Appx. 547 (11th Cir. 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading