Defendant\u2019s \u201creference [in his \u00a7 2255] to his trial counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion to suppress items seized in a search (presumably referring to a search of his apartment made with his consent) is devoid of discussion as to why such a motion would have succeeded.\u201d Thompson v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58805 (D. R.I. June 10, 2010).*<\/p>\n
This was a consent after a knock-and-talk, and defendant\u2019s authorities were all cases involving apparent coercion during the talk. United States v. Perez-Saavedra, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59217 (N.D. Iowa June 15, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Defense counsel withdrew his motion to suppress before defendant\u2019s guilty plea to interstate travel for sex with a minor. This was a reasonable tactical choice after defense counsel learned that the defendant was on a jail recording talking to her to change her story. Carrasco v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58788 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2010).*<\/p>\n
\u201c[I]t was objectively reasonable for agent Jackson to conclude that Awan voluntarily consented to the search of his suitcases at Mian\u2019s residence. Awan has failed to show that the district court committed clear error in crediting Jackson’s testimony rather than Awan\u2019s affidavit.\u201d United States v. Awan<\/a>, 384 Fed. Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).* [Shouldn\u2019t the question really be a finding defendant consented rather than the officer\u2019s belief defendant consented? Aren\u2019t they different things?]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading