The owner of a house had actual authority to consent to a search of an unlocked suitcase of another that she let be stashed in her closet because she had control over it. She consented after a threat to get a search warrant, but it was stating the obvious, so it was not unreasonably coercive. United States v. Cruz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39999 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2010).*<\/p>\n
The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s car for improper display of its temporary tag in the back window, which could not be seen until standing right behind the car. United States v. Jones, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40006 (N.D. Ohio April 7, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Inevitable discovery did not support the search of defendant\u2019s person under an alleged routine procedure. Just because something was \u201cnot uncommon\u201d did not make it \u201croutine.\u201d United States v. Sullivan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40434 (W.D. Ky. April 26, 2010)*:<\/p>\n
The Court finds that Detective Haight’s statements do not amount to sufficient evidence of a “routine procedure.” The fact that a thorough search was “typical” or that multiple searches were “not uncommon” does not establish that something was a routine policy. Further, Detective Haight’s own testimony that he did not arrest for permit violations and had discretion to arrest for license violations speaks against any notion that a search under the circumstances of this case would have been “routine.” The government also failed to present any written police policies or procedures. The Court notes that this case differs significantly from those inevitable discovery cases that involve inventory searches conducted on impounded vehicles, United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2001), or booking procedures in which officers routinely inventory a suspect’s belongings at the police station. See United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1988). There is no evidence here that a more thorough search was an “invariable” procedure. Id. Rather, the decisions made by the officers in this case were largely discretionary, and not exercised according to standard criteria. See Kimes, 246 F.3d at 805.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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