Plain feel to an experienced drug officer is apparently different than other plain feels. If a narc knows it’s drugs, that supports plain feel. United States v. Willis, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39853 (S.D. W.Va. April 22, 2010):<\/p>\n
[T]he plain feel doctrine “does not require absolute certainty that the object is contraband.” United States v. Jones<\/a>, 303 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (D. Md. 2004). “To the contrary, the plain feel doctrine, like the plain view doctrine, only requires that the officer have probable cause to believe that the object is contraband by the time he realizes it is not a weapon.” Id. (citations omitted). At the other end of the spectrum, the officer is not allowed to determine if an item is contraband by “squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of defendant’s pocket.” Dickerson<\/a>, 508 U.S. at 378 (disapproving of officer who engaged in this behavior after he already knew that the item in the defendant’s pocket was not a weapon).<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
When Stephenson felt the pocket, he felt a lump that was hard and round, and that he believed could possibly be crack cocaine. Further, in response to Stephenson’s inquiry as to what the object was, Defendant said it was “work,” meaning drugs. Under the plain feel doctrine, Stephenson was able to seize the Crown Royal bag and the possible contraband. See Jones, 303 F. Supp. 2d 702. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the feel of the lump, the bag Trooper Stephenson saw, as well as what he knew about the location, the Defendant and his experience as a drug investigator, at the time Stephenson realized the lump was not a weapon, he had probable cause to believe that the lump in Defendant’s pocket was illegal contraband. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u201cThe totality of these factors justified Trooper Stokes’ belief that reasonable suspicion existed that defendant was armed and dangerous. Perhaps individually they might not have crossed that threshold, but factors that seem benign when considered separately might establish reasonable suspicion when viewed collectively.\u201d United States v. Umphryes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39106 (E.D. Mich. March 19, 2010).*<\/p>\n
The defendant denied any responsibility for the contents of the seat of the moped he was driving when he was stopped. Therefore, he has no privacy interest and no \u201cstanding.\u201d United States v. Catlett, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39072 (E.D. Ky. January 14, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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