Mere inquiry about a search warrant was not a refusal of consent. United States v. Fletcher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21611 (N.D. Ind. March 9, 2010):<\/p>\n
The Court finds no support in the case law for the proposition that Defendant’s inquiry about a search warrant is tantamount to an express refusal of consent. C.f. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107 ( where the police asked defendant for permission to search the house, “which he unequivocally refused.”) See also United States v. Sims, 435 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545-46 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (defendant’s attempt to slam the door shut as police were entering an express refusal of consent); United States v. Henderson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88404, 2006 WL 3469358, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (the statement “Get the f*** out of my house” a direction that the police refrain from searching the residence); United States v. Foster, 654 F. Supp. 2d 389, 397 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (defendant’s ambiguous statement to officers that he was going to make them earn their pay not an express refusal of consent). Therefore, the Court concludes that Randolph is distinguishable and the search was constitutional on the basis of Mrs. Fletcher’s consent. Accordingly, the Court need not address the Government’s good faith argument.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Smell of marijuana from car and nervousness was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stein, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Kan. 2010).*<\/p>\n
Illegal search led to interrogation of the defendant, and it cannot be said that it was attenuated. United States v. Martinez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585 (D.N.M. February 25, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading