Three great posts by Orin Kerr on the good faith exception and changing law:<\/p>\n
\u2022 The Good Faith Exception and Changing Law: The Context of the Good Faith Exception<\/a><\/p>\n \u2022 The Good Faith Exception and Changing Law: The Benefit of the Exclusionary Rule on Direct Appeal<\/a><\/p>\n \u2022 The Good Faith Exception and Changing Law: The Costs of the Exclusionary Rule, and Balancing Costs and Benefits<\/a><\/p>\n The first paragraph to post 1:<\/p>\n This is my first post in a planned series of posts on why the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when a police officer conducts a search that is lawful when it occurs that is later ruled unlawful before the conviction is final. This issue is being litigated all over the country right now thanks to a clash of two recent Fourth Amendment cases, Herring v. United States, \u2014 U.S. \u2014 (2009) and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___ (2009). Herring has language suggesting a broad approach to the good faith exception, while Gant ruled a common and widely-accepted law enforcement practice unconstitutional. The combination of the two cases raises a question: Should the exclusionary rule apply for the many violations that occurred before Gant was handed down, or does the good faith exception apply so the evidence is admitted? Here is post #1: The Context of the Good-Faith Exception.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading