Computer data particularity requirement and the Fourth Amendment does not constrain how the government must search before the computer is accessed. United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675 (S.D. N.Y. 2010):<\/p>\n
While there may be a degree of uncertainty as to the “precise applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement with respect to searches of computer data,” United States v. McDarrah, 05 Cr. 1182 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48269, 2006 WL 1997638, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (quoting Hensel v. Lussier, 205 F.3d 1323, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) (summary order)), we reject Defendants’ contention that the warrant lacked particularity because it failed to specify different or more precise computer search methods. “[I]t is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). Courts are ill-suited to constrain law enforcement to certain search-terms or methodologies in advance. As Judge Bianco recently noted, “in most instances, there is no way for law enforcement or the courts to know in advance how a criminal may label or code his computer files and\/or documents which contain evidence of criminal activities.” United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). To limit the government’s computer search methodology ex ante would “give criminals the ability to evade law enforcement scrutiny simply by utilizing coded terms in their files or documents” or other creative data concealment techniques. Id. Accordingly, we join the Graziano court and several other federal courts 4 in holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require a search warrant to specify computer search methodology. See id. at 315-16.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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