Officer\u2019s mistake of law about a traffic offense barred application of the good faith exception to this warrantless arrest. The statute was clear, so the lack of decisions under the statute doesn\u2019t matter. United States v. Davis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Va. 2010):<\/p>\n
The United States takes the view that this case is distinguishable because here, the officer was applying an unsettled law. As a result, the United States asserts, applying the exclusionary rule will not result in an appreciable deterrence, one of the primary aims of the rule. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (stating that the exclusionary rule should be applied when doing so will result in appreciable deterrence of future constitutional violations).<\/p>\n
It is true that there is little decisional law applying \u00a7 46.2-926 and perhaps, in that limited sense, the law is unsettled. However, the statutory text of \u00a7 46.2-926 is plain and straight forward. And, when considered in perspective of \u00a7 46.2-928, it simply does not admit of the interpretation pressed here. In any event, the argument made by the United States really is that the officer’s mistake was reasonable. Most circuits have concluded that a reasonable mistake of law simply does not animate the good faith exception. See McDonald, 453 F.3d at 961-62 (holding that the good faith exception does not apply because a “stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable.”); Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106 (holding that allowing the good faith exception for officer’s mistakes of law “would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.”). That reasoning is persuasive and it forecloses application of the good faith exception of Leon.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant\u2019s stop was with probable cause to believe he committed a lane change violation by driving on the rumble strip. As the officer approached the vehicle, he could smell marijuana, and that was probable cause to search. United States v. Ohangbon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15599 (M.D. N.C. February 22, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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