A marina in Puerto Rico was the functional equivalent of the border where there was a high degree of probability that the boat had not changed between being in international waters and arriving in port. United States v. Andujar-Aponte, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124959 (D. P.R. November 10, 2009)*:<\/p>\n
The first issue is whether the agents in this case had “reasonable certainty” or “a high degree of probability” that a border was crossed. “The sea boundary of the United States territory is a marine league (three geographic miles) from shore, Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894 (1923), and comprises a border for fourth amendment purposes.” United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 80 (citing United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d at 787 n.7) (“[T]he three mile limit [off the U.S. coast] establishes the boundary of the territorial sea and is regarded as the border.”)). Here, the CBP and MIA initially spotted the Black Sea “outside U.S. territorial waters,” that is, over twenty-four miles beyond the shore. … At least one of the crew members told CBP officers that the men had been “fishing approximately twenty five (25) miles offshore.” … Defendant does not deny in his brief that the vessel was over three miles beyond the coast. Finally, CCSF intelligence indicated that the Black Sea “was going to be utilized to smuggle narcotics into Puerto Rico.” … The information as a whole was sufficient to establish a “high degree or probability” and even “reasonable certainty” that the Black Sea had crossed a border.<\/p>\n
It is also evident that CBP agents had a reasonable certainty that no change in the vessel occurred between the time it crossed the border and the time the search was conducted. ….<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading