{"id":3826,"date":"2010-09-12T10:12:52","date_gmt":"2010-02-08T00:01:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2010-02-07T14:20:43","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=3826","title":{"rendered":"D.C.Cir.: Officer’s subjective intent for stop was irrelevant because there was an objective basis"},"content":{"rendered":"

Defendant\u2019s car frisk was based on objective observations, and the officer\u2019s supposed subjective belief did not matter. He had a knife, overtinted windows, and a “thin blue line” sticker when he had nothing to do with law enforcement. United States v. Vinton<\/a>, 389 U.S. App. D.C. 199, 594 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010)*:<\/p>\n

Finally, Vinton’s argument that Officer Alton did not subjectively believe Vinton was dangerous may easily be rejected. Because “[t]he Fourth Amendment test is objective,” an officer’s “actual subjective motives … are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of [a] traffic stop and protective search of the car.” United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Of course, it was possible that Vinton used his sheathed knife only for fishing, that he had benign reasons for having excessively tinted windows, and that his “thin blue line” sticker was not meant to be misleading. But “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists … need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Examining the totality of the circumstances objectively, Officer Alton had a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that Vinton was armed and dangerous. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. Thus, he properly searched the passenger compartment of Vinton’s car for additional weapons.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

District court and USMJ credited officers on consent issue, and the evidence supports it, so defendant\u2019s standing does not even have to be decided. United States v. Bater<\/a>, 594 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2010).*<\/p>\n

Speeding on a supermarket parking lot justifies a community caretaking stop because pedestrians were at risk. Pleasant-Bey v. United States<\/a>, 988 A.2d 496 (D.C. App. 2010).*<\/p>\n

A consent to search is non-testimonial and not governed by the Fifth Amendment. State v. Sydnor<\/a>, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (February 2, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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