One court takes a dim view of the viability of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture cases. United States v. Real Property Located at 265 Falcon Road, Carbondale, Williamson County, Illinois, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223 (S.D. Ill. January 4, 2010)*:<\/p>\n
Assuming (1) the exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture cases, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) 1, ….<\/p>\n
1 This has been called into question, see United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 642 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976)).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
[Note: This would only qualify as a weak “cf.” reference because there is no analysis of the issue at all. This case is instructive as to the leanings of the writer: USDJ Phil Gilbert.]<\/p>\n
Defendant\u2019s guilty plea waived his motion to suppress. Webb v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121731 (E.D. Mo. December 31, 2009).*<\/p>\n
An administrative subpoena for ISP information violated no Fourth Amendment interest of the defendant, even if he had \u201cstanding,\u201d which he doesn\u2019t. Also, the good faith exception would apply to an administrative subpoena. United States v. Guthmiller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121794 (D. Minn. December 14, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Officers entered defendant\u2019s property from areas from which any visitor would come, so their knock-and-talk did not intrude on a private area. Defendant came out from a different area, and talked to the officers and consented. United States v. Faller, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2009).*<\/p>\n
Search incident of defendant at stationhouse after a custodial traffic arrest was reasonable. United States v. Amankwaa, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118 (M.D. Pa. January 4, 2010).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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