\u201cCurtilage\u201d in a search warrant is not vague. United States v. Thomas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120653 (M.D. N.C. December 28, 2009):<\/p>\n
. . . Thomas argues that the phrase “curtilage” is conclusory and imbued with legal, not factual, meaning. Thus, he concludes, the magistrate was unable to exercise his or her independent judgment in determining whether to grant the application for the warrant.<\/p>\n
Thomas’s argument is unpersuasive. While having legal meaning, the term “curtilage” also has a common, factual definition. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines curtilage as “a yard, courtyard, or other place of ground included within a fence surrounding a dwelling house.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary at 558 (1986 Ed.) Further, Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[t]he land or yard adjoining a house, usu. protected by an enclosure.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 441 (9th Ed. 2009). Thus, the everyday, common meaning is sufficiently co-extensive with any “legal” meaning. Further, to the extent a phrase may be more commonly known to those familiar with and having some training in law, a magistrate is generally such a person.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u201cIn the instant case, the trial court erred in denying Fuentes’s motion to suppress, as Officer Keirnan did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when she conducted the investigatory stop. The facts known to Officer Keirnan at the time of the stop were not indicative of criminal activity.\u201d The informant\u2019s information was not corroborated. Fuentes v. State<\/a>, 24 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2009).*<\/p>\n
The stop was invalid for lack of probable cause. The search for a weapon was not justified either, even if the stop was valid. United States v. Ferrell, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120841 (E.D. Pa. December 29, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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