Stop of car at a sobriety checkpoint was validly extended because the car matched a BOLO from an hour earlier about a robbery. United States v. Jackson, 680 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. W.Va. 2009):<\/p>\n
In considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court has little difficulty finding this initial stop was constitutional. The officers knew there was a recent armed robbery in close proximity to the checkpoint, the suspects were a white female and black male, and they were the only couple fitting that description that had gone through the checkpoint. Although Corporal Poff was mistaken that the robbery had “just occurred,” the Court finds that even if he had known it had occurred approximately an hour earlier, it was still sufficiently close in time that it would not prohibit the initial investigatory stop.<\/p>\n
Once stopped, the officers on the scene collected Ms. Gilman’s driver’s license and proof of insurance and waited approximately five to eight minutes for Corporal Poff to return. After he arrived, he explained to Ms. Gilman and the defendant that they fit the racial profile of armed robbers. They were then asked to get out of the car and patted down for officer safety. Although the duration of the detention is lengthening, the Court finds that a patdown for officer safety was reasonable in that they knew the robbers were armed. See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 787 (2009) (affirming that officers conducting traffic stops may patdown a passenger if there is reasonable suspicion the passenger may be armed and dangerous). However, the officers found nothing unusual or suspicious during the patdown and there was not anything of a suspicious or incriminating nature in plain view in the car. Nevertheless, the officers separated Ms. Gilman and the defendant and put them in the back of different police cruisers and both were given their Miranda rights. Clearly, Ms. Gilman and the defendant remained seized during this entire time as a reasonable person would not have felt like he or she could walk away from the situation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
A national park road audit validly stopped a DWI. The park service sets up checkpoints out of sight of the entrance booth to verify that all cars entering had paid the required fees. No shortages had ever been found at this park, but they have been elsewhere in the country. (This was not a law enforcement roadblock in enforcing the law against drivers.) United States v. Rodriguez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119687 (S.D. Tex. December 23, 2009):<\/p>\n
Additionally, several cases similar to this action have come before the Ninth Circuit. That court has determined that a checkpoint stop by a federal ranger was reasonable where the purpose was to distribute litter bags, “which included regulations concerning campfires for fire safety, refuse disposal for litter control, and camp restrictions.” United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 2001) (because “the military has a substantial interest in preventing theft of its property and in ensuring national security,” a fixed “checkpoint advanced a substantial public interest”); Freece v. Clackamas County, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087 (D. Or. 2006) (brief seizure to enable ranger “to talk to park users about littering, with the goal of reducing littering” was reasonable). Moreover, in United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit addressed a vehicle checkpoint in the Kings Canyon National Park that was designed “to counter illegal hunting within that park.” Id. at 933. The court concluded that public interest in wildlife protection as well as visitor safety were pressing concerns. Id.<\/p>\n
Second, the public interest must be balanced against the individual’s privacy and liberty interests. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450; Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 2004). Courts must address the “effectiveness of the checkpoint program. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-55. For example, checkpoints have been found constitutional when they resulted in 1.5 percent of drivers being found to be intoxicated, id. at 454-55; and .12 percent of cars being found to contain illegal aliens. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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