{"id":3665,"date":"2010-05-16T19:08:27","date_gmt":"2009-12-24T09:18:47","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2009-12-24T09:18:47","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=3665","title":{"rendered":"TX7: Consent searches: \u201cWould you mind if I look?\u201d is different than \u201cmay I search?\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cWould you mind if I look?\u201d is different than \u201cmay I search?\u201d Defendant\u2019s consent was acquiescence to a claim of authority. Defendant also refused consent. Meekins v. State<\/a>, 303 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. App.\u2014Amarillo 2009):<\/p>\n

The officer had not asked “may I search” but rather “would you mind if I look?” Answering “yes” to the latter meant that appellant did mind. Answering “I guess” also had and has like connotation; that is, saying “I guess” in response to being asked if one minds whether something happens can well indicate that he does. To this we add appellant’s prior evasiveness in response to the officer’s persistence in asking for consent. When combined, the circumstances paint not a picture of clarity or unequivocation but rather one of vacillation and hesitance. More importantly, to somehow conclude from the entirety of the scenario that saying “yes” or “I guess” meant that appellant finally acquiesced to the search invites speculation into various matters. Those matters consist of whether appellant failed to listen to the specific question asked by Williams, whether he ignored the last question and opted to answer those previously propounded, or whether he reinterpreted the question from one asking “would you mind” to one asking “may I search.” Yet, authority denies both this court and the initial factfinder from engaging in speculation given the absence of supporting evidence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Applying Tennessee\u2019s Jacumin test (Aguilar-Spinnelli), the informant\u2019s statement was sufficient to show probable cause. He was not a pure citizen informer, but the basis of knowledge was his interaction with the defendant. State v. Blair<\/a>, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (December 17, 2009).*<\/p>\n

Adult child living there had sufficient common authority over defendant\u2019s home to consent to a search. State v. Williams<\/a>, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1034 (December 17, 2009).*<\/p>\n

The facts in the arrest warrant affidavit showed probable cause for arrest. United States v. Palumbo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117839 (D. Nev. November 23, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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