Probable cause was shown for a search warrant for defendant\u2019s safe deposit box. Even if not it is close enough for the good faith exception to apply. United States v. Claude X, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112641 (W.D. Mo. October 14, 2009) (USMJ R&R), obj. overruled, United States v. Claude X, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112640 (W.D. Mo. December 3, 2009):<\/p>\n
A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the supporting affidavit presents a fair probability that evidence or contraband will be found in the location to be searched. Supporting affidavits must be read in a common-sense fashion and should be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. E.g., United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmiston, 46 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 1995). Defendants complain about the inclusion of information from confidential informants, but the Court need not consider this issue because the remaining information establishes a fair probability that contraband or evidence of drug activity was stored in the safe deposit boxes. Christina insists the affidavit does not connect her to criminal activity, and both Christina and Aarika insist the affidavit does not provide any reason to believe they were storing evidence or contraband in the boxes. Even if they are correct (and, at least with respect to Christina, the Court tends to agree), they miss the point. Probable cause does not require a showing that they were responsible for any evidence or contraband in the boxes, nor does it require a showing that they were criminally culpable. The law only requires a fair probability that evidence or contraband will be found, not that any particular person placed it in the location. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009). The affidavit provided probable cause to believe Claude was using the boxes to store evidence or contraband. A fair, common-sense reading of the affidavit presents probable cause to believe:<\/p>\n
1. Claude was engaged in drug activity.
\n 2. Claude frequently arranged for or oversaw the drug transactions but did not always become personally involved.
\n 3. Claude had large sums of money and no source of income.
\n 4. The boxes were accessed with unusual frequency, particularly in light of his lack of income.
\n 5. The boxes were sometimes accessed on multiple times in a single day, or on consecutive days.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\nIt was reasonable for the judge issuing the warrant to conclude that Claude was — personally or through others — storing drugs or money in the boxes. Whether those “others” (here, Christina) knew about the illicit source of money or otherwise have culpability is irrelevant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The defendant consented only to an entry into the apartment and not a search, but there was sufficient factual basis for a Buie protective sweep which was limited in scope. United States v. Hassock, 676 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).*<\/p>\n
Defendant\u2019s guilty plea waived appeal of his motion to suppress. He could not have relied on Gant<\/a>, which had not yet been decided. The motion to suppress, however, was sufficient to raise a Gant<\/a> scope of search incident claim, but the motion to suppress fails on the merits because of defendant\u2019s actions created reason to believe he was holding at the time of arrest. State v. Snapp<\/a>, 219 P.3d 971 (Wash. App. November 9, 2009).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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