Defendant\u2019s frisk revealed a crack pipe which was obvious from plain feel, since the officer knew a crack pipe when he felt it, having seized hundreds. The search incident of the car was limited and reasonable, and it did not have to stop when the first contraband was found. United States v. Bradford, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110385 (E.D. Wis. November 5, 2009):<\/p>\n
In the present case, as the magistrate judge explained, defendant was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia (not a traffic offense), making it reasonable for the officer to search the car for drugs. Further, once the officer found the bullet, it was reasonable for him to look for a gun. Cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (noting that under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 (1982), police may, based on probable cause that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found, and that Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader).<\/p>\n
Defendant argues that Koestering should have stopped his search after he found the crack cocaine on the front passenger seat, but nothing in Gant suggests that a permissible search incident to arrest must stop as soon as any contraband is found. Nor does the record show that Koestering searched areas of the car where evidence of the offense of arrest could not be located. Defendant suggests that Koestering “ransacked” the car, but the record does not support that contention either. As discussed above, Koestering moved the front seat in order to check the back for more drugs, at which point he saw the bullet. He then looked under the front driver’s seat and saw the gun. Far from a ransacking, this was a limited search, fully justified by the circumstances.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant alien\u2019s fingerprinting was incidental to his removal on his admission he was an illegal, and it was not suppressed. United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110505 (S.D. W.Va. November 25, 2009)*:<\/p>\n
Based upon the entirety of the findings of fact set forth heretofore, the court is satisfied that the 10 minutes of questioning of defendant along the lines set out in Government Exhibit 2, and the taking of his fingerprints, fit within the booking exception. The evidence was obtained for, and was motivated solely by, the administrative purpose of removal, including the reinstatement of the defendant’s prior order of deportation. It is important to note as well that at the time of the road side encounter ICE was on notice, via defendant’s admission, that he did not possess papers showing he was in the United States legally. Hilton’s observations on the point are also noteworthy. He is unchallenged in asserting that illegal reentry cases are generally pursued administratively rather than criminally.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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