{"id":3442,"date":"2010-03-20T13:17:20","date_gmt":"2009-10-15T06:00:03","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2009-10-15T06:00:03","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=3442","title":{"rendered":"E.D.Pa.: CI was not so involved to become a government agent for <em>Franks<\/em> purposes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The CI was not sufficiently involved with law enforcement activities to be a government agent for <a href=\"http:\/\/caselaw.lp.findlaw.com\/scripts\/getcase.pl?court=us&amp;vol=438&amp;invol=154\">Franks<\/a> purposes. United States v. Krall, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95027 (E.D. Pa. October 9, 2009):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The Third Circuit has not articulated a standard for determining whether an individual is acting as an agent or instrument of the Government. Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 325. However, eight other Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the following test or a close variant: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends. Id.; see also United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071, 1074 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006); Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344-45 (4th Cir. 2003) (combining the two elements into &#8220;one highly pertinent consideration&#8221;); United States v. Steiger , 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Malbrough , 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985) (&#8220;First, the police must have instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. Second, the individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative efforts.&#8221;) (citations omitted).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Defendant had no standing in a &#8220;drug house.&#8221;  United States v. Grant, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95076 (S.D. Ohio August 28, 2009):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The uncontradicted evidence indicated that the house at 617 Edison Street was uninhabited and used only as a place to carry on drug transactions. In other words, 617 Edison was a &#8220;drug house&#8221;. Mr. Grant has provided no evidence that anyone lived in the house or kept any personal property in the house. There is certainly no evidence that Mr. Grant lived in the house or was even temporarily staying in the house, or that he ever so much as spent the night in house. Finally, there is no evidence that anyone, particularly Mr. Grant, kept any personal property in the house. Simply stated, there is no evidence that Mr. Grant was ever in the Edison Street house for personal purposes and therefore he had no privacy interest in the house. Because Mr. Grant had no privacy interest in the 617 Edison Street house, he had no standing to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the premises. Therefore, his counsel&#8217;s failure to challenge the search did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Grant&#8217;s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the search of the Edison Street house should be denied.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>&#8220;Having reviewed the dash-cam video and the transcript of the state-court suppression hearing, it is the Court&#8217;s determination that Garcia did not violate \u00a7\u00a7 66-7-330(B) and 66-7-345(C) NMSA (1978) and that Haanes mistakenly believed that Garcia was in violation of the traffic laws. The language of both traffic statutes is plain and unambiguous, and it was not objectively reasonable for Haanes to justify a valid traffic stop of Garcia. See United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d at 991.&#8221; United States v. Garcia, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94609 (D. N.M. September 10, 2009).*<\/p>\n<p>Arrest for a felony does not need an arrest warrant, even if there is time to get one. Defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system, and that is a circumstance favoring consent. United States v. Henderson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110370 (E.D. Mo. November 12, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>b2evALnk.b2WPAutP <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=3442\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"pingsdone","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3442","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3442","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3442"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3442\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3442"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3442"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3442"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}