While state law required a search warrant to be served on the target of the search, leaving a copy on the coffee table in front of the handcuffed accused is sufficient. The Fourth Amendment does not require that the warrant be read to the handcuffed accused [it is doubtful state law did either]. Besides, this was not a sufficient ground to invoke the exclusionary rule [if failure to announce isn’t, failure to read the warrant, a fortiori, isn’t]. United States v. Porter, 654 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2009).* (What about the absent owner? How would such a rule even be applied?)<\/p>\n
The fact the officer was not going to give a ticket for speeding, although there was reason (76 in a 70), asking for papers and stuff did not make the stop otherwise unreasonable. The officer finally smelled marijuana coming from the car when he leaned in. While there was a contradiction in the officer\u2019s testimony from his reports, it was not so material to undermine his credibility. United States v. Bohanon, 629 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).*<\/p>\n
However, Patterson’s testimony indicates he saw no reason to deploy his canine since he detected the odor of marijuana himself. As to whether the marijuana odor was that of burnt or raw marijuana, it is troubling that Patterson appeared to be attempting to conform his testimony during the suppression hearing to his misreading of his affidavit. However, he testified in both the state court proceeding and the suppression hearing that he smelled a marijuana odor coming from the Tahoe. In addition, in his affidavit he noted that he smelled an odor of marijuana. I CONCLUDE Patterson’s inconsistent testimony regarding whether the marijuana odor was burnt or raw, while troubling, does not constitute such a material contradiction that it results in discrediting Patterson’s testimony he detected an odor of marijuana. Therefore, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I credit Patterson’s credible testimony he smelled an odor of marijuana in the Tahoe.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Although all the information about the CI was not in the affidavit for the search warrant, sufficient detail was. Besides, the good faith exception would save this warrant anyway. United States v. Morton, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89820 (W.D. Tenn. September 29, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Thirteen minute traffic stop that led to consent was not unreasonable. United States v. Williams, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90051 (M.D. Fla. September 30, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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