Inevitable discovery supported seizure from a car that the court found no PC for an automobile search. However, an inventory search which was authorized would have discovered the evidence, despite the fact the court does not believe the officer. United States v. Martinez-Pena, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87578 (N.D. Iowa September 23, 2009)*:<\/p>\n
The first prong of the test is more problematic. The only evidence at the suppression hearing regarding the location of the drugs was from Bob Jones, who testified he saw the methamphetamine as soon as he opened the driver’s side door. The court has found this evidence not to be credible, both from the photographs and from the fact that both of the other officers who had a reasonable opportunity to do so failed to notice anything in the driver’s side floorboard. Nevertheless, it also seems reasonable that during a thorough inventory search of the vehicle, Todd Jones and Miller would have checked underneath the seats for items that should be placed on the inventory list. The court therefore finds that inevitable discovery of the illegally-seized evidence during the inventory search was “more likely than not.” See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2779, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987); see also Thomas, 524 F.3d at 861-62 (Colloton, C.J., concurring). As a result, the drugs need not be suppressed.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant was not seized when the officer parked behind the defendant’s legally parked car, walked to the front and started asking questions. The fact the car was blocked, however, and defendant could not leave, was a seizure. United States v. Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87884 (E.D. Pa. September 23, 2009):<\/p>\n
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, however, this Court concludes that the occupants of the vehicle were seized when Officer Haser, whose vehicle was blocking the Intrepid from leaving, instructed the driver, Hicks, to shut off the car engine and Hicks complied. At that point in time, Defendants were faced with a uniformed officer with a holstered weapon who had asked the driver to roll down the window and also instructed the driver to shut off the engine. Furthermore, the Intrepid was blocked in such a way that to terminate the encounter, the driver would have had to back up from his parked spot and maneuver his car around Officer Haser’s patrol car. To accomplish this, the driver would have either had to defy Officer Haser and start the engine again or Defendants would have had to exit the vehicle and abandon the car with the officer only a few feet away. Instead, Hicks complied with Officer Haser’s show of authority and shut off the engine. A reasonable person in the situation in which the occupants of the Intrepid found themselves would not feel free to ignore the police officer and go about his or her business. See United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Here, by blocking in the Nissan, the officers had communicated to a reasonable person occupying the Nissan that he or she was not free to drive away.”).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
A party to a business dispute was temporarily ousted by Sheriff’s deputies enforcing a court order. The business dispute led to an order of possession, a stay, and a bankruptcy and a stay of the stay until it was dissolved. The Sheriff’s deputies had qualified immunity. Dever v. Kelly<\/a>, 348 Fed. Appx. 107, 2009 FED App. 0656N (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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