The officers\u2019 attempt at procuring a search warrant failed several statutory requirements because of his lack of training and experience. They sought help from other officers and failed to get it. The town JP also failed to so some things, but none of it rises to the level of bad faith to justify suppressing the search. The officers acted with good faith throughout, and that was sufficient to invoke the GFE to the exclusionary rule. (Half the opinion is quoting from Leon and Herring because of their relevance to the outcome.) United States v. Monroe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80479 (W.D. N.Y. March 17, 2009):<\/p>\n
This lack of knowledge and experience is not “sufficiently deliberate” so as to “trigger the exclusionary rule;” nor is it “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, supra, 172 L.Ed.2d at 507. The actions of Sergeant Lott and Detective Walters do not constitute “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” and therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant at issue herein be in all respects DENIED.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Although Rule 12 does not state what a defendant has to show to get a suppression hearing, under Third Circuit precedent the defendant needs to show a colorable factual dispute to get a suppression hearing. United States v. Boyd, 652 F. Supp. 2d 546 (D. Del. 2009).<\/p>\n
Consent to search a car for drugs includes anywhere drugs can be hidden. Defendant’s approach of the officers was not a withdrawal of the consent. He was waived off for officer safety. United States v. Jimenez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80410 (E.D. Tenn. September 2, 2009).*<\/p>\n
The search warrant in this case authorized both the seizure and search of defendant’s computer for child porn. The actual search occurred after the ten days for seizure, but this was not a constitutional violation (citing many cases). United States v. Cameron, 652 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Maine 2009).*<\/p>\n
The stop of defendant was justified because the vehicle matched the description of a vehicle and occupants involved in a break-in within three minutes of the anonymous call and within a block in a high crime area. It was the only vehicle like it. United States v. Barrera-Omana, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80413 (D. Minn. August 14, 2009).*<\/p>\n
The officer had cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on the driver’s admissions on the tape during the stop. His implausible travel plans gave reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jimenez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80590 (E.D. Tenn. February 23, 2009),* adopted United States v. Sanders, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80569 (E.D. Tenn. June 11, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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