Police had probable cause for a search of the residence, but they determined not to get an anticipatory warrant and see what happened with a knock-and-talk to see if consent could be obtained, which it was. United States v. Jones, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (W.D.Wis. 2009).* The court made this observation in n. 1:<\/p>\n
Indeed, Officer Arnold testified that the police had mulled obtaining an anticipatory search warrant, but decided to wait and see what happened at the scene. Jones challenges this claim, but it’s a logical and efficient approach. Preparing a search warrant affidavit and jumping through the hoops to obtain a warrant is time-consuming and toilsome. That’s why police often gamble on obtaining consent at the scene before starting the warrant process. (It’s also why police push hard for consent, something that courts must scrutinize closely.) A corollary is that people who are asked to consent often agree because the alternative is to be locked out of their residence for a couple of hours before the search even begins. But choosing between two unpalatable choices does not render the decision involuntary. See United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir. 2006).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Search of defendant’s car was justified by the automobile exception and not limited by Gant. United States v. Williams, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73997 (W.D. Ky. August 18, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Plaintiff organizations lacked standing to challenge the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 because they were one step more removed than the plaintiffs without standing in ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). Amnesty Int’l of the United States v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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