Business records in a car were subject to search on PC or search incident for fraud. Some records in this fraud case, however, were seized without PC. United States v. Mitan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63890 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2009):<\/p>\n
However, these are the only items for which Strosnider had developed sufficient probable cause to search. The Court finds that police could not have had a reasonable belief that any other Prime-Line related evidence was in the vehicle. The mere fact that Strosnider viewed a large volume of business-related documents in the car does not lead to the logical conclusion that these documents were related to the Prime-Line fraud. Therefore only the cards, UPS packaging, and Virtually Wireless items are admissible evidence related to Prime-Line Inc.<\/p>\n
Along the same line of reasoning, Strosnider did not have probable cause to search for documents related to businesses other than Prime-Line or evidence of any other crime. Although Ross allows a search of “every part of the vehicle … that may conceal the object of the search,” 456 U.S. at 825, the precedents do not permit a search to go beyond that particular object.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Retest after hot UA was not purely for disciplinary procedures so it was admissible in a court martial under Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). United States v. Ayala<\/a>, 2009 CCA LEXIS 266 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 15, 2009) (unpublished):<\/p>\n
A subsequent order to provide a urine sample for drug testing following a random, positive drug urinalysis test qualifies as an inspection under Mil. R. Evid. 313(b), the results of which are admissible at trial, provided the orders are made pursuant to an established, pre-existing policy or guideline and the subsequent order is not made for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a trial by court-martial or in other disciplinary proceedings. Bickel, 30 M.J. at 286-88.<\/p>\n
In the case sub judice, the military judge made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. His findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and we adopt them as our own. Additionally, his decision was not based on an erroneous view of the law. While the wing staff judge advocate’s advice on the drug testing re-inspection policy focused exclusively on the use of such results for disciplinary purposes, the questioned policy makes clear that re-inspection was being done, not as a disciplinary tool, but to ensure “security, military fitness, and good order and discipline.” Moreover, the staff judge advocate’s advice on the basis for implementing the questioned policy cannot automatically be attributed to the wing commander. United States v. Hamilton, 41 M.J. 32, 37 (C.M.A. 1994). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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