A person who stops for an officer’s emergency lights has been seized. “Willoughby’s actions of remaining at the scene and stepping out of his car as Officer Gillmore approached constituted submission to the officers’ show of authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court and district court properly concluded that Willoughby was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” The court follows and quotes State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570 (Kan. 2003): <\/p>\n
Where there is neither force nor obvious words or actions of submission, some courts have applied the Mendenhall<\/a> approach without reference to Hodari<\/a>. E.g., United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir. 1995). Other courts have determined that the individual’s inaction, albeit passive, is a form of compliance and a submission to authority. E.g., Lawson, 120 Md.App. at 617-18, 707 A.2d 947 ….<\/p>\n
We join this line of cases in terms of outcome, doing so by following the line of cases which hold that Hodari, and in this state our decision in [State v. Weaver, 915 P.2d 746 (1996)], requires a finding that the accused submitted to the show of authority. In this case, Morris did not attempt to leave when officers pulled in behind him with their emergency lights flashing. Upon seeing the flashing emergency lights of the officer’s patrol car, Morris complied with the officer’s “show of authority” enjoining him to remain. He did not flee; instead, he complied with the assertion of authority. We find that Morris was seized within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ….<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This stop was without reasonable suspicion. State v. Willoughby<\/a>, 211 P.3d 91 (Ida. 2009).*<\/p>\n
Postal employee impliedly consented to search of his car by driving it on to post office property. He was aware that could happen. United States v. Collamore<\/a>, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10691 (10th Cir. May 19, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Government showed that defendant consented to a search of his property and there was no language barrier because they talked to him about various things which he understood before consent was sought. United States v. Huraibi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42904 (W.D. N.Y. May 21, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Passing reference to voluntariness in a motion to suppress was not IAC because counsel probably focused more on the other issues, in light of the presumption of competence of counsel. Bustamante v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42935 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading