Search of an office in a portable trailer separate from an airport hanger where the hanger was the subject of a search warrant was unreasonable under the warrant. The good faith exception does not apply to execution issues like this. United States v. Garner, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39562 (W.D. Wash. April 27, 2009):<\/p>\n
Plaintiff argues that suppression of the evidence obtained is not an automatic consequence of an unreasonable search. Dkt. 55 at 7-9. Plaintiff asserts that the Court should rely on the good faith exception announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon<\/a>, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Defendants counter with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006), that the Leon<\/a> exception does not apply when “the problem lies in the execution, and not the constitutionality, of the search warrant.” Id. at 746. Although the Court is unaware of any direct Ninth Circuit support for this proposition, the Circuit did explicitly distinguish the Angelos holding in United States v. Hurd, 499 F.3d 963, 969 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2007). In Hurd, the court upheld the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress finding that “it was objectively reasonable for Officer Clifton to believe that Judge Kurshner authorized the search of Hurd’s residence, despite [Judge Kurshner’s] failure to initial the appropriate line on the search warrant.” Id. at 969. Specifically, the defendant argued that this holding would create an inter-circuit conflict with Angelos, but the court disagreed and stated that Angelos was “readily distinguishable.”<\/p>\n
In this case, the Court finds that the execution of the search warrant was more similar to the Angelos scenario rather than the Hurd scenario. In other words, it was objectively unreasonable for the officers conducting the search to understand that the scope of the search warrant contemplated that the Royal Limousine Office would have been found outside of, and a significant distance from, the leased airport hangar. Therefore, the Court finds that the Leon good faith exception does not apply to overcome the suppression of the evidence seized from the trailer in violation of the Defendants’ constitutional rights.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant’s stop was objectively reasonable and justified, and he validly consented after that. [Anders brief] United States v. Sands<\/a>, 329 Fed. Appx. 794 (10th Cir. 2009)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
Defendant was objectively stopped for a window tint violation, and it was discovered that he was driving on a suspended DL. Consent was sought and refused, but the officer testified he always did that even when an inventory was coming. Here, the inventory was valid under the department regulations, and a gun was found. Defendant’s argument that it was invalid as a search incident under Gant<\/a> was not reached. United States v. Elliot, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40222 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2009).*<\/p>\n
The consenter’s consent to searching the safe in their apartment was not limited by her concerns of breaking it open. She just did not want it damaged. United States v. Awoussi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39994 (D. Neb. May 11, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s racial profiling claim against the officer [not his first] fails because the defense failed to show that there was no objective basis for the stop. United States v. Benitez, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Iowa 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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