{"id":3030,"date":"2009-07-29T06:57:02","date_gmt":"2009-03-30T07:05:07","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2009-03-30T07:05:07","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=3030","title":{"rendered":"N.D.N.Y.: PV warrant authorized entry into third party’s property where he would be found"},"content":{"rendered":"

The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendants were engaged in drug smuggling into the Virgin Islands. The court agrees that each act individually did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, but collectively (as under Arvizu<\/a>) they did. United States v. Mathurin<\/a>, 561 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2009).*<\/p>\n

Informant’s tip that defendant was involved in heroin dealing was corroborated by stop with cause that showed lots of cash in the car. When defendant was out of the car, there was heroin in plain view on the floor. United States v. Walker<\/a>, 319 Fed. Appx. 307 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n

Officer acted reasonably in discharging his gun in the direction of the plaintiff and bystanders where plaintiff was fleeing police on three flat tires and refused to stop. Marion v. City of Corydon<\/a>, 559 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2009).*<\/p>\n

Defendant was the subject of a knock-and-talk, and he let officers in the house and then signed a consent to search. Officers found money and marijuana which defendant attributed to somebody else. The district court’s finding of consent was supported by the credibility determinations of the district court. United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez<\/a>, 317 Fed. Appx. 790 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n

A PV warrant was issued for defendant, and he was believed to be in a particular apartment, and he was found there. He was either without standing to challenge the entry because he had insufficient connection to the property or, under Payton<\/a>, the arrest warrant was enough. United States v. Pabon, 603 F. Supp. 2d 406 (N.D. N.Y. March 24, 2009):<\/p>\n

Defendant relies on Steagald v. United States<\/a>, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) for the argument that the police did not have the authority to enter Apartment F-6 in order to arrest the Defendant. Deft’s Post-Hearing Memo. at 6. The Court in Steagald<\/a> held that the Fourth Amendment protects a third party not named in an arrest warrant from intrusion into his home without a search warrant, but it declined to extend this protection to the person named in the arrest warrant who was apprehended in the third party’s home. 451 U. S. 204, 219 (leaving open the question “whether the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a search warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home.”). In addition, the Supreme Court had explicitly distinguished between the effect of the arrest warrant on the person being arrested-noting that the arrest warrant made his seizure reasonable-versus its effect on the person whose home was entered-noting that the arrest warrant did not permit the search of the home. 451 U. S. 204, 213 (“while the warrant in this case may have protected [arrestee] from an unreasonable seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect petitioner’s privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home.”).<\/p>\n

Accordingly, other circuits have extended this reasoning to find that where a defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant while in the home of a third party without a search warrant for the third party’s home, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 483-86 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc ); United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299-300 (6th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2003). Relying on Steagald, the Third Circuit explained that the lack of a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the third party, “[b]ut this right is personal to the home owner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the person named in the arrest warrant.” Agnew, 407 F.3d at 196-97. The Second Circuit referred to this analysis favorably in United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 132 (2nd Cir. 2006), explaining that the other circuits extended Steagald’s logic ….<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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