The search warrant had a typographical error in the address of the place to be searched, but the right place was searched. The good faith exception applies to save the search warrant. United States v. Harris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20580 (S.D. Tex. March 16, 2009):<\/p>\n
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule shall apply. The facts in the instant case are analogous to those in Gordon, where the officer-affiant who mistakenly identified the premises accompanied the executing officers on the search and pointed out the proper location. In Gordon, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), to uphold the validity of a warrant even though it contained an incorrect address because, inter alia, the affiant accompanied the executing officers on the search and was able to point out the proper location. Gordon, 901 F.2d at 50 (citing Burke, 784 F.2d at 1093).<\/p>\n
Subsequently, in United States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit upheld the search of apartment 15-D where the search warrant specified apartment 15-C based upon incorrect information provided by the CI. Before obtaining the search warrant, the officer-affiant took the CI to the general location of the apartment building, and the CI pointed out the defendant’s apartment. The CI identified the apartment as 15-C, but the officer-affiant was unable to verify the apartment number with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, the officer-affiant obtained a search warrant and led the search team to the apartment the CI pointed out to him. The Fifth Circuit found that, because the affiant and the executing officer were the same person, “there was no possibility the wrong premises would be searched.” Id. at 1210 (quoting Gordon, 901 F.2d at 50). Additionally, the affiant had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant had been properly issued and comported with the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing a suppression motion because the CI was a citizen informant subject to a lower standard of scrutiny and there was probable cause. And, even if not a citizen informant, the PC was still sufficient, and defendant could not prevail. Malone v. State<\/a>, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 175 (March 11, 2009).*<\/p>\n
The initial traffic stop was only six minutes long, and the second round of questions was by consent. Latta v. State<\/a>, 2009 WY 35, 202 P.3d 1069 (2009).*<\/p>\n
Nexus of defendant’s campsite to a grow site was shown by the movement of vehicles. “This case is therefore not one of speculative inferences piled upon inferences, as Rodrigue would have us believe. Rather, this is a case where the affidavit recited facts establishing a clear and substantial connection between the illegal activity and the place searched; whatever inferences were required to find probable cause, they were reasonable.” United States v. Rodrigue<\/a>, 560 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009).*<\/p>\n
Controlled buy by the CI within 24 hours was sufficient to show PC. United States v. Johnson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20163 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement from an in home interrogation that was a police dominated atmosphere because they came in with guns drawn to search for a laptop computer under a search warrant. United States v. Dierking, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20083 (S.D. Cal. March 9, 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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