Defendant’s version of events that included highly improbable things led to the District Court not believing the defense version of the stop. United States v. Yancy, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021 (E.D. Ark. February 13, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s cell phones were seized under a search warrant, and the delay in searching them was reasonable. “‘Suppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.’ Hudson v. Michigan<\/a>, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).” United States v. Thompson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13153 (S.D. Fla. February 6, 2009).*<\/p>\n Court finds that officers could not have seen into the apartment from the hallway as they alleged, so their claim in the search warrant affidavit was false and it issued without probable cause. United States v. Norwood, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107318 (E.D. Mich. December 19, 2008).*<\/p>\n Surveillance in a marijuana trafficking case provided probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify entry into a motel room to seize the marijuana. Surveillance had to close in, and the co-conspirators would realize they were made. United States v. Granados, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (D. S.D. September 19, 2008).*<\/p>\n Officer was required by DMV to retain defendant’s license, but not detain him, and that did not convert the stop into a detention of the defendant. United States v. Gamez<\/a>, 311 Fed. Appx. 671 (4th Cir. 2009)* (unpublished):<\/p>\n Moreover, although the addition of the final factor, the retention of Gamez’s driver’s license, briefly gives us pause, we are not persuaded that it prevented this lawful Terry stop from becoming a voluntary encounter. In cases in which courts have found retention of travel documents particularly compelling, the documents in question were not only necessary for the defendant to continue on his way, but also were the defendant’s rightful property. Their retention therefore presented the defendant with the untenable choice of ending the encounter with no legal means of actually leaving the scene, or consenting to further interaction with law enforcement in order to retrieve the documents. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-04, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (retention of the defendant’s airline ticket and driver’s license); United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (retention of defendant’s rental car agreement); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816-17 (10th Cir. 1991) (retention of defendant’s lawful driver’s license and registration).<\/p>\n In sharp contrast to these cases, the DMV order indisputably required Officer Crump to retain Gamez’s license. Thus, Gamez could not legally have driven away even had he wanted to do so. Moreover, Officer Crump explicitly informed Gamez that he was free to go.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading