Defendant’s statements in a bankruptcy proceeding where he disavowed any interest in a Las Vegas house showed he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the house. His post hoc rationalizations were not believed. Going to the merits of reasonable expectation of privacy, he loses there, too. United States v. Burke, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4762 (E.D. Va. January 23, 2009):<\/p>\n
Prior to the search, at the time of the search, and months after the search, defendant expressly denied living at the residence and having any ownership interest in the residence or in the boxes stored in the garage and the house. His explicit statements and conduct relinquished any expectation of privacy in the place searched and the property seized. His contradictory and self-serving testimony made years after the search during the course of the criminal prosecution is not credible. As such, the court could deny defendant’s motion to suppress on this basis alone. See Decoud, 456 F.3d at 1007; United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1510 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress because his conduct demonstrates that he did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Vehicle validly seized by the police was still subject to the automobile exception where there was probable cause. A security sweep of the premises that was strictly limited was valid, too. United States v. Weeks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5841 (D.Del. January 26, 2009).*<\/p>\n
Officers had probable cause for something after the PC for drugs evaporated. They had probable cause to believe he was driving on a suspended driver’s license, and they learned of the federal investigation. They could continue on the suspended license. Their subjective intent was irrelevant. United States v. Turner<\/a>, 553 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 2009).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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