Rule 41 violations are subject to an intentional disregard rule, and defendant failed to show it here as to one of several warrants served concurrently with one after 10 p.m., the others before 10 p.m. The state officer testified that he was unware of the 10 p.m. execution rule. United States v. Deas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96088 (D. Conn. November 24, 2008)*:<\/p>\n
Courts have repeatedly held that suppression is rarely the proper remedy for a Rule 41 violation; only a “fundamental” violation of Rule 41, i.e. one that “renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards,” requires automatic suppression. United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.6 (1974); United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 901 (2005)); United States v. Smith, 340 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). The Second Circuit has articulated two additional circumstances under which a violation of Rule 41 requires suppression of the evidence: (1) the defendant was prejudiced, in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed; or (2) there is evidence of “intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.” United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 385-87 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule does not require suppression of evidence found in a search).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Sexual advances from a school teacher did not rise to a Fourth Amendment violation; something else, yes. Maier v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96368 (W.D. Pa. November 26, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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