There is no expectation of privacy in the sidewalk in front of a house. United States v. Turner, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93637 (E.D. Mo. November 18, 2008)*:<\/p>\n
Without even considering the argument that Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the property because he did not reside there, it is clear that there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in the pathway that the officers took to get to the front door. This pathway is used by the general public to approach the house for business and social purposes and can be used in the same manner by police officers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
There is a First Amendment right of access in the public to search warrant materials. In re New York Times Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. D.C. November 17, 2008) (anthrax mailings case).* <\/p>\n
A Title III warrant does not have a Rule 41 inventory because the searches are fundamentally different. United States v. Franco, 585 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ohio November 17, 2008):<\/p>\n
Neither \u00a7 2518(8)(d) nor Rule 41 requires anything similar with regard to the material seized through execution of an electronic search under Title III. This is so, even though the circumstances of an electronic search differ significantly from those of a conventional search.<\/p>\n
When officers execute a conventional search, the target, if present, knows immediately that the search has occurred. Even if the target is not present, the receipt mandated by Rule 41(f)(1)(C) provides detailed notice as to what has been taken. Moreover, Rule 41(f)(1)(D) requires the officers to return the inventory mandated by subsection (B) to the issuing Magistrate Judge; that judicial officer, in turn, “must, on request, give a copy of the inventory to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(D).<\/p>\n
The target of a conventional search thus knows either at the time of the search or shortly thereafter that it has occurred and, even more importantly, what was taken.<\/p>\n
Neither is true with an electronic search, which by its nature must be and remain secret until surveillance has ended. Even thereafter, \u00a7 2518(8)(d) allows the secrecy to continue for up to three months. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
“The Fourth Amendment, of course, protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. It does not protect against the fear or possibility of an unreasonable search or seizure, which is at most what Plaintiffs have alleged. The Fourth Amendment claim is therefore dismissed.” Stockham Interests, LLC v. Borough of Morrisville, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93152 (E.D. Pa. November 12, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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