Based on the credibility of witnesses, the court finds that defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to entry. “The Court also finds the implicit consent was particularly logical in the context of the fact that Defendant had just beaten her a short time earlier.” United States v. Stiner, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2008), Accepted by, Adopted by United States v. Stiner, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla., 2008)
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Officer’s parking near defendant and walking up to the car was not a seizure because the defendant was not blocked in and the officer did not demonstrate such a show of authority that defendant was compelled to stay. State v. Wilkes<\/a>, 756 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa Sup. 2008):<\/p>\n We conclude under all the facts and circumstances that no seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment when Wood approached the vehicle. Simply put, neither of the officers displayed coercive or authoritative behavior to transform this encounter into a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Prior to smelling alcohol on Wilkes’ person, the stop was consensual. Once Wood smelled the alcohol, he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to detain Wilkes and administer sobriety tests. See Mark A. Bross, The Impact of <\/em>Ornelas v. United States<\/a> on the Appellate Standard of Review for Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment<\/em>, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 871, 881 (2007) (noting that a voluntary encounter may turn into seizure supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause). As a result of our determination that a seizure did not occur until after Wood had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to restrain Wilkes, it is not necessary to consider whether the encounter was within the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading