911 call about man with a gun from an identified source was exigent circumstance for entry. United States v. Sodagar, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60566 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2008):<\/p>\n
The government relies on the “risk of danger” exigency. See Brigham City<\/em><\/a>, 547 U.S. at 403 (“[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”); United States v. Kempf<\/em>, 400 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[a]n example of exigent circumstances is when police reasonably fear for their safety or the safety of someone inside the premises.”). The Seventh Circuit has explained that “911 calls reporting an emergency can be enough to support warrantless searches under the exigent circumstances exception, particularly where, as here, the caller has identified himself.” United States v. Richardson<\/em>, 208 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2000). The court also noted that 911 calls fit “neatly with a central purpose of the exigent circumstances (or emergency) exception to the warrant requirement, namely, to ensure that the police or other government agents are able to assist persons in danger or otherwise in need of assistance.” Id<\/em>. at 629. In keeping with the purpose of the 911 emergency alert system, officers should be able to fully respond to a person’s cry for help, which could reasonably include looking for a weapon which was used in violent threat. See, e.g., United States v. Elder<\/em>, 466 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that officers’ entry into an outbuilding housing a possible meth lab was reasonable after a 911 call was placed because “consideration of safety–the caller’s and the officer’s–made a look-see prudent.”). Additionally, 911 calls conveying a threat of gun violence can be a further indicator of exigency. The Supreme Court stated in Welsh v. Wisconsin<\/em><\/a>, a case dealing with exigent circumstances in the context of a warrantless arrest, that “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.” 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984); see also Biernacki<\/em>, No. 95 C 1694, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18695, 1996 WL 727396, at *5 (police responding to a 911 call about a husband refusing to give a wife her car keys with no report of violence did not qualify as exigent circumstances such that the police could enter).<\/p>\n
In this case, the police were at Sodagar’s home because of Saarum’s 911 call. During this call Saarum reported that Sodagar had threatened him with a gun. Saarum repeated this to the officers when they arrived on the scene and Sodagar confirmed that the two had been fighting, although he denied he possessed a gun. Seema, however, told the police that the gun might be in the bedroom closet, corroborating the possibility that a gun was involved. Although the supplemental police report stated that “the incident deescalated very quickly and all occupants were cooperative with police requests,” the officers on the scene were nonetheless there to investigate “any domestic violence.” Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, Ex. C; see also United States v. Martinez<\/em>, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he volatility of situations involving domestic violence make them particularly well-suited for an application of the emergency doctrine”); United States v. Reed<\/em>, 935 F.2d 641, 643 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing a few examples where the Fourth Circuit as well as the Eleventh, Ninth, and Eighth Circuits found that “the presence of guns” can “justify searches and seizures on the basis of exigent circumstances.”). From the officers’ perspective, they reasonably could have anticipated that if they had left the scene, the conflict could have reignited, and if there was a gun inside Sodagar might have later acted on the threats reported by Saarum.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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