The search of defendant’s car was justified under the automobile exception because it was readily mobile and there was probable cause. As to the search of his house, there is no requirement that the search warrant name the defendant. United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008)*:<\/p>\n
Within this framework, we consider whether the search of the blue Nissan comports with the Fourth Amendment. The testimony about King driving the Nissan to meet Detective Ropka demonstrates that the Nissan was readily mobile. And, the car’s registration to Blaylock and King indicates it was subject to regulations that necessarily diminished any expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The question, then, is whether probable cause existed for the search. We conclude there was more than sufficient probable cause for the officers to conclude the Nissan contained evidence of illegal activity. On two separate occasions within the month prior to the search, the Nissan was used to further drug trafficking. On August 30, Blaylock retrieved crack cocaine from the Nissan before selling it to Detective Ropka. On September 8, the transaction between King and Detective Ropka occurred in the car. These facts demonstrated a clear link between the car and drug trafficking sufficient to provide probable cause to search the Nissan.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
None of the arguments raised by Blaylock undermines the district court’s conclusion that the search conducted pursuant to the warrant comported with the Fourth Amendment. First, a search warrant need not name any particular defendant against whom evidence will be used in order to be valid; it must only “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
District court’s determination that defendant consented to a search was binding on the appeals court since there was some evidence to support. United States v. Skeffery, 283 Fed. Appx. 75 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s probable cause argument would fail as a matter of law, so his appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising it. United States v. Simmons, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56961 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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