{"id":2305,"date":"2008-12-23T17:02:54","date_gmt":"2008-07-30T15:36:28","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-07-30T15:36:28","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=2305","title":{"rendered":"FL5: Reasonable mistake of fact doesn’t void stop"},"content":{"rendered":"

Officer’s reasonable error of fact about window tint did not void the stop. State v. Wimberly<\/a>, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 11440 (Fla. App. 5th DCA July 25, 2008):<\/p>\n

If an officer makes traffic stop based on a mistake of fact, the court must determine whether the officer’s mistake of fact was reasonable. Great deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement officers “on the scene.” See Saucier<\/em>, 533 U.S. at 205-06 (discussing excessive force claims while noting that excessive force and probable cause determinations are subject to same Fourth Amendment analysis). “The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be … viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. …” Ornelas<\/em>, 517 U.S. at 696. “[W]hat is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government … is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.” Illinois v. Rodriguez<\/em>, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). An officer’s mistake of fact may provide the objective basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause under the Fourth Amendment because of the intensely fact-sensitive nature of reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations. See Ornelas<\/em>, 517 U.S. at 695-96. Consequently, an officer’s mistake of fact does not necessarily render his actions unreasonable, because what is reasonable will be dependent on the specific circumstances presented by each case. Chanthasouxat<\/em>, 342 F.3d at 1276. To hold otherwise would force police to determine conclusively whether a violation had occurred before they have probable cause to investigate it. Such a standard would be more expansive than the Fourth Amendment, which limits only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Trial court’s credibility determination on defendant’s consent. Pritchard v. State<\/a>, 987 So. 2d 204, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D 1852 (Fla. App. 5th DCA 2008).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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