The nature of seizure of all computer files in a document search involving a Pennsylvania State Senator usually requires that they be searched off site to determine whether they are pertinent, and that does not make execution of the warrant unreasonable. United States v. Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2008):<\/p>\n
I have already concluded that “because of the nature of computer files, the government may legally open and briefly examine each file when searching a computer pursuant to a valid warrant,” in order to determine which files are described by the warrant. See United States v. Fumo<\/em>, No 06-319, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80543, 2007 WL 3232112, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2007). For “few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked ‘[crime] records.'” United States v. Riley<\/em>, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990). Given the large volume of information on computer equipment and security concerns, for reasons of practicality the government may conduct this review of computer files offsite. For example, in United States v. Stewart, another district court judge upheld a search and seizure pursuant to a warrant authorizing seizure of “[a]ll computer hardware and software containing any of the items mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Attachment.” No. 96-583, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5181, 1997 WL 189381, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997). The “computers were taken [by the agents] with the intent to copy the files, return the computers, then later sort through the files for relevant information.” 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5181, [WL] at *4. The court found the procedure to be “proper” and not violative of the Fourth Amendment because “[i]t was simply not practical for the agents to search at the scene all the files on the computer hard drives of all three computers as well as their accompanying diskettes, especially since their computer expert was not at the search location.” Id.<\/em> The court further noted that “[s]uch a procedure, that is, taking voluminous documents or computer files for copying and sorting away from the search location, has been upheld.” Id<\/em>. (citing United States v. Henson<\/em>, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fawole<\/em>, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Santarelli<\/em>, 778 F.2d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also, e.g., United States v. Hill<\/em>, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) …; United States v. Campos<\/em>, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2000) …; United States v. Upham<\/em>, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) …; United States v. Schandl<\/em>, 947 F.2d 462, 465-66 (11th Cir. 1991) …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife’s car, that he shot at the police from, to have standing to contest a search. Thomas v. State<\/a>, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 287 (Tex. App. \u2014 San Antonio January 16, 2008), released for publication May 23, 2008, pdr refused In re Thomas, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tex. Crim. App., Apr. 9, 2008).* (Comment:<\/em> This case is dead wrong on standing. It seems obvious that the vehicle was subject to a search incident, and the court should have just decided that instead of some completely off the wall finding that a defendant has no standing in his spouse’s vehicle. And, because there is an alternative ground that is correct, SCOTUS would never take it, and it was up to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to correct it. Good luck there.)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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