{"id":21873,"date":"2016-04-26T08:25:06","date_gmt":"2016-04-26T13:25:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=21873"},"modified":"2016-04-26T08:25:06","modified_gmt":"2016-04-26T13:25:06","slug":"lawfare-fisa-gathered-information-in-ordinary-criminal-cases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=21873","title":{"rendered":"Lawfare: FISA gathered information in ordinary criminal cases"},"content":{"rendered":"

Lawfare: Section 702: Programmatic Collection and the Wall Reprised<\/a> by Emma Buchsbaum:
\n<\/p>\n

Congress has begun its long journey towards a likely reauthorization of the Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. PCLOB devoted significant ink to 702 in a 2014 report and followed up this February with an assessment of the implementation of its recommendations. Among these was a proposal for \u201cadditional limits . . . on the FBI\u2019s use and dissemination of Section 702 data in connection with non-foreign intelligence criminal matters.\u201d This recommendation reflected concern about the use of U.S. person information collected incidentally or inadvertently through Section 702\u2019s programmatic surveillance. In other words, it mirrors the concerns behind the old \u201cFISA wall\u201d separating foreign intelligence collection from domestic law enforcement.<\/p>\n

… <\/p>\n

While front-end protections distinguish the treatment of U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons\u2014reflecting underlying Fourth Amendment and policy distinctions\u2014 the question of what to do with the data once we have it is complicated by the fact that, inevitably, non-targeted information of Americans will be collected. That question is really two: how should the data be shared within the IC, and to what extent can it be used in subsequent criminal proceedings?<\/p>\n

The answer to the latter question is, apparently, that it may be used to a significant extent in criminal proceedings. This seems consistent with opinions from the FISA Court of Review, which emphasized the lack of Fourth Amendment protections for incidental eavesdropping, and generally affirmed the reasonableness of non-individualized data collection as part of a broader program.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lawfare: Section 702: Programmatic Collection and the Wall Reprised by Emma Buchsbaum:<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-21873","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-fisa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21873","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=21873"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21873\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":21874,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21873\/revisions\/21874"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=21873"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=21873"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=21873"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}