Probation search condition that permitted search of work place computer was not unreasonable and furthered the purposes of probation. United States v. Proctor, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11789 (3d Cir. June 2, 2008) (unpublished). Curiously, in a warrantless search case, the court implicitly puts the burden on the defense to show that the search was unreasonable rather than the government to show it was reasonable. But, at bottom, it ulimately isn’t that simple because the search was found valid before the court said he cannot show it was not:<\/p>\n
Proctor cites no case holding that it is unreasonable to require a supervised releasee to submit to a warrantless search of his workplace. Indeed, imposing this condition on Proctor, who used computer software to share images depicting child pornography with others over the internet, is reasonably related to the \u00a7 3553(a) factors of deterrence, protection, and rehabilitation. See Loy<\/em>, 237 F.3d at 256. The fact that this may affect Proctor’s employer is of no moment because Proctor lacks standing to object that this condition would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a prospective employer or co-worker. See Rakas v. Illinois<\/em>, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978) (a third party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search only when one has a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the premises or items searched). <\/p>\n
Nor does the warrantless search of Proctor’s place of business infringe on his personal liberties more than is reasonably necessary. Although this condition might well impair Proctor’s ability to find a job, we find that it is necessary to meet the goals of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(d)(2) in light of Proctor’s offenses. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Proctor to submit to warrantless searches at his place of business. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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